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Abstract: 
UK Think-Tanks, the War on Terror and the Radicalisation Debate 
Hadi Enayat 
 
The paper will attempt to map the discursive and ideological habitus in which UK think-tanks 
operate in connection with the ‘war on terror’. It will discuss how UK think-tanks have both 
shaped and been shaped by this habitus and the impact their work has had on counter-
terrorism policy in the UK. It will begin by discussing the concept of think-tanks and their role 
and input into politics. It will then sketch the rise of ‘terrorism’ as both an academic object of 
study, from the mid-1970s onwards, and as an increasingly vital policy area for governments 
and the military-security establishment, especially after 9/11. The paper will then focus on UK 
think-tanks dividing them into three broad categories: conservative-orthodox think-tanks, 
establishment think-tanks and alternative-radical think-tanks. Based on this small but 
hopefully representative sample, it is argued that the think-tanks in the first category have 
been the most influential in official UK counter-terrorism strategy. These are think-tanks 
which have generally emphasised ideology—especially radical Islam—as the main driver of 
terrorism and deradicalisation programmes like PREVENT as the antidote to this problem. 
Think-tanks in the other two categories—which have emphasised other factors such as 
grievances, networks and group dynamics—have been less influential in terms of public policy 
although there is evidence that these factors have been taken more seriously by the UK 
intelligence services if not always by successive UK governments. In discussing these issues, it 
is hoped that this paper will form the foundation for a number of other forthcoming AKU-
ISMC working papers on Islam, think-tanks and security in various European countries. 
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UK Think-Tanks, the War on Terror and the 
Radicalisation Debate 
 
Hadi Enayat 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will attempt to map the discursive and ideological habitus in which UK 
think-tanks operate in connection with the ‘war on terror’. It will discuss how UK 
think-tanks have both shaped and been shaped by this habitus and the impact their 
work has had on counter-terrorism policy in the UK. It will begin by discussing the 
concept of think-tanks and their role and input into politics. It will then sketch the rise 
of ‘terrorism’ as both an academic object of study, from the mid-1970s onwards, and 
as an increasingly vital policy area for governments and the military-security 
establishment, especially after 9/11. The paper will then focus on UK think-tanks 
dividing them into three broad categories: conservative-orthodox think-tanks, 
establishment think-tanks and alternative-radical think-tanks. Based on this small but 
hopefully representative sample, it is argued that the think-tanks in the first category 
have been the most influential in official UK counter-terrorism strategy. These are 
think-tanks which have generally emphasised ideology—especially radical Islam—as 
the main driver of terrorism and deradicalisation programmes like PREVENT as the 
antidote to this problem. Think-tanks in the other two categories—which have 
emphasised other factors such as grievances, networks and group dynamics—have 
been less influential in terms of public policy although there is evidence that these 
factors have been taken more seriously by the UK intelligence services if not always by 
successive UK governments. In discussing these issues, it is hoped that this paper will 
form the foundation for a number of other forthcoming AKU-ISMC working papers on 
Islam, think-tanks and security in various European countries. 
 
1) What is a think-tank? 
 
The term ‘think-tank’ was first coined in the US during the Second World War to refer 
to a secure room or environment in which policy makers could meet to discuss wartime 
 5 
strategy.1 In the UK, think-tanks can be traced as far back as the early nineteenth 
century with the establishment in 1831 of the Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), considered in more detail further below, which 
was founded by the Duke of Wellington.2 Today there are over 200 think-tanks in the 
UK most of them small in terms of staff and with relatively moderate financial 
resources. Think-tanks often want to influence policy, but have no formal political 
power. Moreover, whilst they claim to be politically neutral they often make no secret 
of their ideological positions.3 Think-tanks develop policies which are intended to be 
considered by governments and opposition parties alike. They inform manifestos and 
formulate ideas well outside of what the civil service are tasked with or political parties 
have the time and resources to develop. They are also feeder organisations for state 
institutions and their employees often move seamlessly back and forth between think-
tanks and government positions.4   
 
But as think-tanks have grown in number and become more diverse, scholars have 
been unable to reach a consensus on exactly how to describe them.5 Some think-tanks 
are charities and others private limited companies. Some focus on very specific areas 
such as defence or health while others cover a wide range of policies. This has led to 
the construction of various typologies to account for the range of institutions that 
populate the think-tank community. For example, according to Robert Weaver and 
James McGann’s well known typology, most think-tanks are either of the ‘academic’ 
or ‘advocacy’ type.6 The former type is characterised by heavy reliance on academics 
                                                     
1 Abelson (2014), p. 127. 
2 Ibid., p. 135. 
3 Hartwig Pautz, ‘Surprisingly, U.K. think tanks don’t often communicate with elected officials’, 
Democratic Audit, 2014. Retrieved 10th September 2020: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57676/1/democraticaudit.com-
Surprisingly_UK_think_tanks_dont_often_communicate_with_elected_officials.pdf  
4 Emma Burnell ‘Who funds you? Think-tanks are being tarnished by secretive right-wingers’, Politico, 
5th February 2019. Retrieved: 8th September 2020: https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2019/02/05/who-funds-you-think-tanks-are-all-being-tarnished-by-secreti  
5 Pautz (2014), p. 346.  
6 See Weaver and McGann (2002). Note that Weaver identified a third type which he called ‘contract 
research organizations’ which are hired by government departments to carry out a very specific form 
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and researchers and a stress on non-partisanship and objectivity. These more 
‘academic’ think-tanks relieve their research fellows from teaching duties; in 
exchange, they expect a certain public impact—columns, op-eds, talk-shows and best-
sellers. The latter type identified by Weaver and McGann— ‘advocacy think-tanks’—
combine a strong ideological bent with explicit efforts to influence current policy 
debates. Their output is less academic and often consists of synthesising and 
repackaging existing ideas.7 In this more ideological form think-tanks are part of what 
George Monbiot calls the ‘infrastructure of persuasion’8—the material structures of 
ideology deployed by various political factions to try to gain hegemony over a polity or 
discourse.9 The activity of think-tanks of this type may resemble that of pressure 
groups employing expertise to achieve their aims. These ‘new partisan’ think-tanks 
rose to prominence in the 1970s as the producers of a counter-discourse to the 
Keynesian consensus.10 Indeed, during this period some of them were instrumental in 
shifting the ‘Overton window’ of British politics to the right and facilitating the 
establishment of a new neoliberal orthodoxy. These include the Centre for Policy 
Studies, the Institute for Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute.11 The British 
centre-left caught up with this development in the late 1980s with its own advocacy 
think-tanks (such as the Institute for Public Policy Research and Demos).12 At their 
most influential then ‘advocacy’ think-tanks can frame, inform and elevate policy 
debates, deploying their intellectual capital to affect policy outcomes.13 This process of 
framing and shifting the parameters of a debate can be dramatic but the process itself 
                                                     
of often technocratic research and are mostly non-partisan (Pautz 2014, p. 347). This type of think-
tank will not feature in this paper. 
7 Pautz (2014), op. cit. 
8 George Monbiot, ‘No 10 and the secretly funded lobby groups intent on undermining democracy’, 
The Guardian, 1st September 2020. Retrieved 8th September 2020: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/01/no-10-lobby-groups-democracy-policy-
exchange   
9 Sadeghi-Boroujerdi (2019), p. 21. 
10 Stone (1996), p. 17; Denham (1996). 
11 The term ‘Overton window’ was coined in the mid-1990s by Joseph Overton—at the time a 
researcher for the US based think-tank, the Mackinak Centre for Public Policy—to refer to how the 
acceptable range of ideas in a particular society shifts over time (Smith 2019, p. 149). 
12 Pautz (2014), p. 347. 
13 Drezner (2017), p. 130. 
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takes place in myriad small and subtle ways. As David Wearing puts it: ‘Assumptions 
are established and boundaries set over a long period of time, across a wide range of 
individual speeches and texts, by those who have the platform and the inclination to 
do so’.14 At their best, a heterogeneous array of think-tanks can offer a contrarian voice 
to a policy community that might be afflicted by groupthink—revealing its blind-spots 
and offering alternative views. In this way, a think-tank can nurture disruptive ideas 
that challenge the status quo and eventually become politically palatable.15   
 
Fundraising is a major part of think-tank life. Researchers need to be paid and 
overheads need to be covered. This money must be raised and generally that involves 
finding sponsors for research projects, maintaining a stream of donations, and, in 
some cases charging for membership.16 How does funding shape the output of think-
tanks? Pressure to find funders can have a negative effect on the work of think-tanks, 
though reputable organisations will generally not sell their skills to provide superficial 
preordained research. Conversely, while funders of think-tanks are not usually doing 
it purely for altruistic reasons, that does not necessarily mean they expect to benefit 
directly from a think-tank they have supported. At the beginning of a contractual 
relationship a creditable think-tank will generally negotiate what a patron can and 
cannot expect for their money.17 But some think-tanks are more transparent than 
others about their finances and recent reports about a secretive network of libertarian 
and free market think-tanks deliberately hiding their funding sources has confirmed 
all the worst stereotypes of think-tanks as essentially PR agencies for various elite 
interests.18 In connection with funding and the constraints they place on think-tanks, 
Tom Medvetz has argued that: ‘think tanks must carry out a delicate balancing act that 
involves signalling their cognitive autonomy to a general audience while at the same 
                                                     
14 David Wearing, ‘Why is the BBC presenting RUSI as objective analysts of the Middle East?’, Open 
Democracy, 11th June 2015. Retrieved 12th September 2020: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-of-
middle-east/  
15 Ibid. 
16 Burnell op. cit. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Sarah Neville, ‘British think-tanks less transparent about sources of funding’, The Financial Times, 
17th February 2015. Retrieved 11th September 2020: https://www.ft.com/content/ae6968c4-b5ec-
11e4-b58d-00144feab7de  
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time signalling their heteronomy—or willingness to subordinate their production to 
the demands of clients—to a more restricted audience’.19 He suggests that the 
comparative advantage of think-tanks has been their ability and willingness to 
genuflect to wealthy, powerful patrons and thus monopolise what he labels the 
‘interstitial field’ between the academic world, the corporate sector and public policy.20 
Indeed, think-tanks can be seen as a hybrid of an academic department and a law 
firm.21 However, both think-tanks as institutions and the individual analysts they 
employ must also cater to the demands of their clients more than even the most 
conciliatory academics. Universities have large endowments and/or state-funding and 
an additional revenue stream from tuition fees whereas think-tanks are much more 
reliant upon benefactors and donors to finance themselves.22 Moreover, research at 
think-tanks is often also geared to serving government, causing them to become more 
deferential to the interests of state bureaucracies. This incentive structure suggests 
that think-tanks pushing for a place at the policymaking table will be less critical of 
powerful organisations than academics.23 But in the face of increased cuts across the 
UK university sector, many individual scholars and departments actively seek out 
government funding and cultivate relationships with policymakers as a way of 
demonstrating their continued ‘relevance’.24 Meanwhile, policy elites often 
categorically dismiss academic scholars as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘hostile’ to UK interests in the 
Middle East. The consequences of excluding academic voices—particularly those 
critical of US policies in the region—have sometimes been dire as we shall see.25 
 
2) The rise of terrorism expertise 
 
We will now turn to looking at the rise of ‘terrorism’ as an object of academic study—
one which has been significantly shaped by the think-tank community especially in the 
                                                     
19 Medvetz (2012), p. 18. 
20 Ibid., p. 25. 
21 Drezner (2017), p. 129. 
22 Ibid., p. 130. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Negar Razavi, ‘The Systematic Problem with Iran “Expertise” in Washington’, Jadalliya, 4th 
September 2019. Retrieved 15th September 2020: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/39946  
25
 Ibid. 
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US. At the start of the 1970s there were few, if any, terrorism experts. Recalling the 
state of affairs in terrorism studies at the beginning of the 1970s one expert wrote: 
‘There really were no general experts in the analysis of terror, only those with special 
academic skills (a knowledge of the Palestinian Fedayeen, or a career focused on 
deviant behaviour) that could be related to the problem’.26 Moreover, before the 1970s 
there was a consensus amongst national security officials that legitimate grievances 
often underpinned political violence—then mainly referred to as ‘insurgency’. This 
concept was largely underpinned by the notion that the way to stop political violence 
was to remove its causes. For example, whilst using the word ‘terrorist’ a US 
government memo from 1974 stated: ‘The US government recognizes the merits of 
elimination of causes of terrorism, including legitimate grievances which motivate 
potential terrorists’.27  Notably, in the 1950s and 1960s ‘terrorists’ were variously 
referred to as ‘bandits, rebels, guerrillas, or later, urban revolutionaries or 
insurgents’.28 
 
This was to change over the course of the 1970s as expert discourse on bombings, 
hijackings, ‘skyjackings’ and kidnappings shifted from a framework organised around 
‘insurgency’ to one organised around ‘terrorism’, a shift that fundamentally 
transformed the understanding of political violence.29 Lisa Stampnitzky identifies the 
1972 Munich hostage crisis at the Olympics as a turning point in the shift toward use 
of the term ‘terrorist’.30 The advent of the use of the concept ‘terrorist’ completely 
altered the moral evaluation of these actors, who started to be seen as ‘pathological 
evildoers’.31 Moreover, whereas ‘insurgents’ were generally assumed to be rational 
actors, who could be countered with a similarly rational strategy of counterinsurgency 
and sometimes negotiation, the rationality of ‘terrorists’, and thus the possibilities for 
a rational and ‘reasonable’ treatment of the problem, would be constantly called into 
question. Furthermore, while insurgencies were generally considered to stem from 
                                                     
26 Bell (1977) quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 29. 
27 US government memo ‘Guidelines for dealing with terrorism with international ramifications’, 1974. 
Quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 72. 
28 Tucker (1997), p. 2 quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 2. 
29 Ditrych (2014), p. 56. Stampnitzky (2013), p. 18.  
30 Ditrych (2014), p. 112. Stampnitzky (2013), p. 21.  
31 Stampnitzky (2013), p. 3. 
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political motives, the question of whether terrorists even had political goals would 
come to be highly contested, with terrorists often depicted as nihilistic ‘rebels without 
a cause’. Thus, whilst the insurgency framework at least implied the possibility that 
political violence might be resolved by addressing grievances and dialogue, the 
terrorism framework tended to rule out such a possibility from consideration.32 
Finally, whereas previously it was acknowledged that there was such a thing as ‘state 
terrorism’ by the late 1970s ‘terrorism’ was attributed largely to non-state actors.33  
 
These discursive shifts were facilitated by a core group of terrorism scholars who 
emerged in the late 1970s and informally referred to themselves as the ‘terrorism 
mafia’.34 These included a number of key experts, some of whom remain influential 
today, such as David Rapoport, Martha Crenshaw, Brian Jenkins and Paul Wilkinson, 
Yonah Alexander, Walter Laqueur and Ariel Merari.35 As Jenkins would write in 1979, 
‘there is a kind of informal, international network of scholars and government officials 
with interests and responsibilities in the area of terrorism. A kind of “college without 
a campus” has emerged’.36 The ‘mafia’ consisted of a core group at the centre of the 
emerging terrorism studies world, who took on the project of making the field a 
legitimate area of study. They organised events such as conferences and seminars, 
places to publish such as journals and edited books and established institutions and 
research centres. These projects both provided mediums of communication among 
experts and aimed to establish the importance of the terrorism research project itself. 
The process of developing an expert identity, and of building the collective project of 
‘terrorism studies’ was thus intertwined with strategies to legitimate ‘terrorism’ as an 
object of knowledge.37 Institutionally, this process found expression with the creation 
of a terrorism programme at RAND (1972) headed by Brian Jenkins and funded by the 
US government. This was part of the US’s new counter-terrorism apparatus that was 
meant to ‘provide a broad understanding of the origins, theory, strategy and tactics of 
                                                     
32 Ibid., p. 51. 
33 Ibid., p. 137. 
34 Ibid., p. 39. 
35 Miller and Mills (2009), p. 415. 
36 Jenkins (1983) quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 42. 
37 Stampnitzky (2013), p. 43. 
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modern terrorism’.38  As Ondrej Ditrych points out ‘RAND was a crucial institutional 
site for the constitution of discursive practices of both power and knowledge in this 
period since it was a major recipient of government funding and a privileged provider 
of scientific expertise’.39  
 
Despite this powerful and well-endowed institutional apparatus many terrorism 
experts were often untenured and minor academic figures who stumbled somewhat 
accidentally into the field from various other disciplines (psychology, criminology, 
sociology, political science, law and medicine).40 Indeed, it has been a highly porous 
discipline with people from adjacent disciplines often dipping in and out. As 
Stampnitzky has observed, ‘rather than looking like a discipline or a closed “cultural 
field” terrorism expertise is constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between 
academia, the state, and the media’.41 Consequently, despite the networked world of 
the ‘terrorism mafia’, Stampnitzky argues that terrorism experts have struggled to 
police their own subject, and many self-proclaimed experts have entered the fray.42 As 
we shall see, Stampnizky’s analysis is in contrast to scholars working within ‘critical 
terrorism studies’ (considered more below) who argue that the fact that many of these 
experts were affiliated to right-wing think-tanks, the military, or the private security 
sector has meant that they have become an influential ‘epistemic community’—a 
network of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships 
which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type 
of policies to which they should be applied’.43  
 
In the 1970s ‘terrorism’ was largely treated as a crime to be dealt with by international 
law. This approach meant that international lawyers focused on particular crimes such 
as ‘skyjacking’, kidnapping and bombing.44 But once these various crimes were 
discursively synthesised into the broader category of ‘terrorism’ the legalistic approach 
                                                     
38 Quoted in Ranstorp (2009), p. 20. 
39 Ditrych (2014), p. 112. 
40 Stampnitzky (2013), p. 45. 
41 Ibid., p. 149. 
42 Ibid., p. 7. 
43 Jackson et al (2007), p. 8. 
44 Stampnitzky (2013), p. 233. 
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was undermined by the constant inability to define exactly what ‘terrorism’ meant.45 
Later, in the 1980s there was a shift from the criminal paradigm to treating terrorism 
as a kind of war. This was accompanied by a new narrative that reframed terrorism as 
a civilisational struggle, between ‘the free-democratic West’ and a network of terrorists 
organised by the Soviet Union.46 This rendered legal and criminal approaches useless 
and a military logic came to the fore. But, in contrast to the pre-emptive logic of the 
‘war on terror’ that would arise after the 9/11 attacks, this first war on terror was driven 
by logic of retaliation, in which military counterterrorism strikes were the equivalent 
of punishment for a crime. This reframing of terrorism as ‘war’ was an explicit 
technique of delegitimisation because ‘terrorism’ was defined as operating outside the 
laws of war and thus illegitimate in both means and ends.47  
 
With the end of the Cold War a new discourse emerged in order to characterise ‘Islamic 
terrorism’. This new discourse would ultimately coalesce under the framework of the 
‘new terrorism’. From this perspective religion is seen as the major cause of violence 
in the contemporary world and the central feature which marks off the ‘old’ from the 
‘new’ terrorism—the former based on secular ideology and thus more ‘rational’ and 
amenable to compromise and the latter often seen as more dangerous because it is 
religious and thus based on transcendental and absolutists claims. Thus, religion is 
viewed as especially prone to violence because it is enormously effective in 
accomplishing what Kierkegaard called ‘the religious suspension of the ethical’.48 The 
‘new terrorism’ discourse put forth the idea that terrorism in the 1990s was being 
committed by a new type of terrorist who was prone to committing unprecedented 
levels of violence due to their extreme irrationality. The tactic of suicide bombing in 
particular was seen as emblematic of the nihilistic and irrational mindset of this form 
of terrorism. Proponents of this view argued that religiously inspired terrorists are 
determined to cause mass casualties among civilians, are driven to sacrifice 
themselves in murderous suicide attacks and would be willing to employ weapons of 
                                                     
45 Ditrych (2014), p. 56 
46 Ibid., p. 7. The key text making this claim—widely read by counterterrorism officials—was Claire 
Sterling (1981) The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
47 Ditrych (2014), p. 110. 
48 Lincoln (2006), p. 138. 
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mass destruction. It is therefore a more murderous form of terrorism than the world 
has seen before.49 Magnus Ranstorp, for example, argues that religious extremists are 
‘relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence 
used’, because they lack ‘any moral constraints in the use of violence’.50  Similarly, 
Jessica Stern asserts that ‘Religious terrorist groups are more violent than their secular 
counterparts and are probably more likely to use weapons of mass destruction’.51 There 
is no possibility of negotiation, compromise or appeasement with these new brands of 
terrorism; instead, eradication, deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism are the only 
reasonable responses.52  
 
There have been some dissenting voices to these views from within the ‘terrorism 
mafia’. For example, Martha Crenshaw has questioned the distinction between the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, arguing that it may be the structure rather than the content 
of a particular ideology which is more important in pushing its adherents to commit 
violent acts. Such structural features include utopian visions, a belief that 
violence/terrorism is not only necessary but morally ‘right’, millenarianism, 
dehumanisation of the enemy and the idea that the masses are suffering from ‘false 
consciousness’. These features have been shared by both ‘secular’ (old) and ‘religious’ 
(new) terrorist organisations from right-wing nationalists and militant communists to 
present day Jihadists.  
 
But Crenshaw’s positions notwithstanding, terrorism experts were generally in 
agreement about the nature of the ‘new terrorism’—particularly the threat of ‘Islamic 
terrorism’.53 This discourse derived a great many of its core assumptions and 
narratives from the long tradition of Orientalist scholarship on Islam and the Middle 
East. This literature expanded in academia as well as in popular culture in response to 
tumultuous events in the Middle East such as the 1972 Munich massacre, the 1979 
American embassy hostage crisis in Iran, the Rushdie affair and the terrorist 
                                                     
49 Jackson (2007), p. 409. 
50 Ranstorp (1996), p. 58. 
51 Stern (2000), p. 264. 
52 Jackson (2007), p. 409. 
53 Crenshaw (2011), pp. 52-66. 
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kidnappings and hijackings of the 1980s.54 Even though it was challenged by an anti-
Orientalist discourse largely inspired by Edward Said’s book Orientalism (1978) it was 
boosted by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent war on terrorism. Importantly, Samuel 
Huntington's highly influential 1993 essay ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, the title of 
which is derived from a much-cited article by Bernard Lewis entitled ‘The Roots of 
Muslim Rage’ (1990), reproduced a number of Orientalist claims for an international 
affairs audience and was therefore an important antecedent of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
discourse.55 Huntington’s thesis became an influential foreign policy paradigm even 
though by 9/11 he had himself grown sceptical of it. Indeed, he rejected the notion that 
the 9/11 attacks had confirmed his thesis, and encouraged realism and restraint.56 If 
he had claimed in his original article that Islam has ‘bloody borders’, he now 
contended that Islam was not ‘any more violent than any other religion’.57 But 
ultimately it was Lewis’s more hawkish views that were to prevail after 9/11. Indeed, 
unlike Huntington, Lewis disdained realism and argued that the US was no longer 
facing a rational actor in which the logics of realism would apply.58 Islam, Lewis 
argued, had a chip on its shoulder ever since the Ottomans were defeated at the gates 
of Vienna in 1683; after which it watched in humiliation as the West overtook it 
‘militarily, economically and culturally’.59 In his post 9/11 bestseller What Went 
Wrong? Lewis attributed the clash between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ to the former’s 
failure to modernise.60 ‘I have no doubt’ he told journalist Michael Hirsh, that 
‘September 11 was the opening salvo of the final battle’.61 In an interview with the cable 
satellite network C-SPAN, shortly after the twin-towers came down, Lewis claimed 
                                                     
54 Jackson (2007), p. 399. 
55 Huntington (1993), Lewis (1990). 
56 Ahmad (2014), p. 73. 
57 Lewis quoted in Michael Steinberger, ‘So, are civilizations at war?’, The Observer, 21st October 2001. 
Retrieved 6th September 2020: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/21/afghanistan.religion2  
58 Ahmad (2014), p. 73. 
59 Lewis quoted in Peter Waldman, ‘A Historian’s Take on Islam Steers US in Terrorism Fight’, The 
Wall Street Journal, 3rd February 2004. Retrieved 20th September 2020: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107576070484918411  
60 Lewis (2002). 
61 Michael Hirsh, ‘Bernard Lewis Revisited’, Washington Monthly, 1st November 2004. Retrieved 20th 
September 2020: https://washingtonmonthly.com/2004/11/01/bernard-lewis-revisited/  
 15 
that ‘the question people are asking is why they hate us. That’s the wrong question.’—
because for Lewis this hatred was ‘axiomatic’, ‘natural’ and ‘centuries old’. ‘The 
question we should be asking’, he suggested, ‘is why they neither fear nor respect us?’62 
A decisive show of American power was necessary to restore respect and where better 
to start than at the heart of the Arab world in Iraq. Lewis’s ideas would assume 
devastating significance after 9/11 when he would gain the ear of Vice President Dick 
Cheney—one of the main architects of the Iraq war.63 As we shall see, they were also 
to be a formative influence in the positions taken by the UK-based neoconservative 
think-tank, the Henry Jackson Society.  
 
In response to the rise of terror expertise a body of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) 
has emerged to critique existing research on terrorism and its political effects. Notable 
practitioners working within CTS include Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, Andrew 
Silke and Arun Kundnani. In order to promote this current of scholarship a new 
international, peer-reviewed academic journal called Critical Studies on Terrorism 
was established and published by Routledge in 2007.64 Employing a Gramscian 
perspective, CTS scholars have argued that ‘orthodox’ terrorism experts (such as the 
‘terrorism mafia’) function as ‘organic intellectuals’ intimately connected—
institutionally, financially, politically and ideologically— with a state hegemonic 
project.65 They have argued that there are a number of reasons why a critical turn 
within terrorism studies is necessary.
 
One reason concerns the dominance of state-
centric, problem-solving approaches within terrorism studies and the close ideological 
and organisational association of key researchers with state institutions— and the 
concomitant problems of ‘embedded expertise’. Indeed, orthodox terrorism studies is 
criticised for its overly prescriptive focus—a reflection of its theoretical and 
institutional origins in counter-insurgency studies, as we have seen. An influential 
review described much of the field’s early output as ‘counterinsurgency masquerading 
as political science’.66
 
It is also argued that much of the scholarship in orthodox 
terrorism studies has been somewhat superficial characterised by ahistoricity and 
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heavy reliance on secondary sources replicating knowledge that by and large reinforces 
the status quo. Thus, to quote O’Leary and Silke: ‘much of what is written about 
terrorism … is written by people who have never met a terrorist, or have never actually 
spent significant time on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict’.67 Scholars 
working within CTS also challenge the distinction between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
terrorism, outlined above, and widen their understanding of terrorism to include state 
terrorism. Indeed, they highlight with concern the fact that, with only a few notable 
exceptions,
 
terrorism studies as a discipline has failed to engage with the issues and 
practices of state terrorism,68 which, they argue, in terms of the scale of human 
suffering and numbers of deaths caused, is a much more serious problem than non-
state terrorism.69 Moreover, it has been argued from within this literature that state 
and non-state terrorism are co-constituted— sometimes directly through state-
sponsored terror and sometimes indirectly through violent interactions between state 
and non-state actors.70 Finally, these scholars have tended to emphasise the political 
grievances which, they argue, are a major driver of terrorism. 
 
The work of CTS scholars has been an important antidote to the excesses of some of 
the work produced in ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies. But there are also some pitfalls in 
the CTS approach. Indeed, in a joint article three of the leading scholars in this 
tradition have noted in a self-critical register that: ‘If emancipation is central to the 
critical project, we would argue that CTS cannot remain policy-irrelevant without 
belying its emancipatory commitment. It has to move beyond critique and 
deconstruction to reconstruction and policy-relevance’.71 This implies the 
responsibility to constructively engage with the challenges faced not only by targeted 
communities such as Muslims but also with the challenges facing counterterrorism 
officials with the responsibility for ensuring public security and safety.72 Moreover, 
CTS has sometimes overstated the stability and homogeneity of what they call 
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‘orthodox terrorism studies’ which contains divergent voices not always as deferential 
to elite interests—Martha Crenshaw’s work for example. As we shall see CTS has been 
a distinct influence on the ‘alternative-radical’ think-tanks considered further below. 
 
3) UK think-tanks and the war on terror 
 
We will now turn to an analysis of UK think-tanks and their positions on various 
aspects of the ‘war on terror’. The following discussion will look at a small sample of 
some of the larger, well-endowed UK think-tanks (with the exception of Claystone 
which is very small) categorising them using the designations: orthodox-conservative 
think-tanks, establishment think-tanks and radical-alternative think-tanks. This has 
been done because the issues surrounding the war on terror such as racism, Islam, 
multiculturalism and the causes of ‘radicalisation’ do not map neatly on to the left-
right spectrum in UK politics. Indeed, some of the publications considered below are 
written by authors who are left wing in terms of their positions on anti-racism, anti-
imperialism and social justice but who have aligned themselves with Islamist-leaning 
think-tanks which have taken very conservative positions on issues such as gender, 
secularism and freedom of expression—Arun Kundnani (who has worked for 
Claystone) for example. Conversely, other think-tanks have taken centre-left wing 
positions on economic issues and harder-right positions on issues surrounding 
immigration and multiculturalism such as the ‘post-liberal’ intellectual David 
Goodhart—currently the director of Policy Exchange.73 
 
A) Orthodox-conservative think-tanks  
 
These are think-tanks which have generally hewn the most closely to what CTS 
scholars refer to as ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies discussed above. Think-tanks in this 
category include: The Quilliam Foundation, The Henry Jackson Society and Policy 
Exchange. Whilst there are some divergent views within these think-tanks the 
dominant narrative expounded by them is that the US and its allies are at war with 
Islamism which is waging an essentially political war against ‘Western values’ or the 
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Western ‘way of life’. In this narrative, ‘terrorists’ are irrational—motivated primarily 
by religious dogmatism and hatred and thus implacable and unscrupulous.74 Thus, 
given the nature and scale of the threat, the ‘terrorists’ must be met with aggressive 
military action abroad and repressive policies at home. Moreover, they have tended to 
subscribe, implicitly or explicitly, to the ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalisation: that 
Islamist ideology mechanically pushes a person towards violent extremism. The 
antidote to the totalitarian ideology of Islamism is ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes 
such as PREVENT and the promotion of more liberal and spiritual forms of Islam. 
These think-tanks also tend to be critical of multiculturalism as a set of policies which 
has encouraged separatism and division and nurtured cultures which do not respect 
‘British values’. 
 
i) The Quilliam Foundation  
 
The Quilliam Foundation was established in 2008 by Ed Hussein (author of the best-
selling The Islamist published a year earlier) and Maajid Nawaz, both of whom had 
been activists in Hizb ut-Tahrir before becoming disillusioned and eventually 
becoming amongst the most prolific critics of Islamism in the UK. The foundation was 
named after Abdullah William Quilliam (1856-1932), a solicitor from Liverpool who 
converted to Islam and founded Britain's first mosque. 
 
Whilst it has not explicitly endorsed the ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalisation 
Quilliam has been foundational in legitimising the official narrative of radicalisation 
and in implementing the PREVENT programme.75 For a while Hussein and Nawaz 
regularly appeared in the media and on the conference circuit, arguing that political 
issues such as the Iraq war were not all that important in explaining terrorist attacks 
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in Britain. Rather, they said, the root problem was the ideology of Islamism, and the 
best way to prevent terrorism was for states to create a Western Islam that was quietist 
and devotional rather than activist and political. Speaking before a US Congress Select 
Committee in 2008 Nawaz said: 
 
There is a common misperception on the left in the U.K. whereby they 
only speak about grievances as a cause for radicalization. Now, I had my 
own grievances growing up in Essex. Many of my friends were attacked, 
violently assaulted by racists. My friends have been stabbed before my 
eyes, my white English friends, simply for associating with me. I have 
been falsely arrested on a number of occasions and released with an 
apology, and I have never been convicted of a criminal offense in any 
country in the world. I had my own grievances. What makes somebody, 
who has localized grievances, turn into somebody who identifies with a 
global struggle in a country that has nothing to do with him?76 
     
To answer this question Nawaz went on to argue that we have to understand the way 
in which these grievances interact with Islamist ideology to generate a whole new set 
of grievances, ‘which for an Islamist can be summarized in one sentence, and that is 
that God's law does not exist on this earth’.77 In his statement to the committee Nawaz 
stated that this ideology is made up of four elements which are shared by all Islamists 
despite their differences in tactics: i) the notion of Islam as a comprehensive political 
ideology, ii) the notion of sharia as a personal code that should be applied by the state, 
iii) the notion of the umma as a global political rather than religious community and 
iv) the desire to establish a global caliphate.78 From this perspective Nawaz argued 
that terrorism cannot be explained by grievances alone and that ideology is a necessary 
factor which acts as a lightning rod which channels and multiplies those grievances 
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into terrorism.79 On this basis challenging the Islamist narrative became the priority 
for Quilliam. The foundation launched a programme of radicalisation awareness 
training among police officers, teachers, social workers and others and became one of 
the main organisations responsible for implementing the UK government’s PREVENT 
programme.80 In taking up this role Quilliam has faced sharp criticism from many 
voices from within the UK Muslim community who have seen the programme as 
discriminatory and counterproductive.81  
 
ii) Policy Exchange 
 
Policy Exchange (PX) has been described in The Daily Telegraph as ‘the largest, but 
also the most influential think-tank on the right’82 and more recently in The Guardian 
as ‘the lobby group that Boris Johnson uses the most’.83 It was created in 2002 by the 
Conservative MPs Francis Maude, Archie Norman, and Nick Boles, who later also 
became a Tory MP. A key figure in the formative years of PX was Michael Gove, a 
founding chairman of PX and the current Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. After 
the 2005 London bombings Gove published a book, Celsius 7/7, in which he defined 
‘Islamism’ as an ideology that is similar to fascism and included Tariq Ramadan—the 
reformist Islamic intellectual—as a follower. In the book he states that in the war 
against ‘Islamism’, it will be necessary for Britain to carry out assassinations of 
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terrorist suspects, in order to send ‘a vital signal of resolution’. More broadly, a 
‘temporary curtailment of liberties’ will be needed to prevent Islamism from 
destroying western civilisation.84 Gove’s views in this book displayed a distinctly neo-
conservative perspective which will be considered further below when discussing the 
more radical right-wing think-tank the Henry Jackson Society—with which Gove is 
also associated. 
 
In January 2007, PX released a wide-ranging report on Muslims and multiculturalism, 
entitled Living Apart Together.85 Munira Mirza, a co-author of the report, is now 
working as head of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s policy unit and was recently 
appointed as head of a commission to look at race inequality in the UK. Billed as an 
attempt to find ‘the reasons why there has been a significant rise in Islamic 
fundamentalism amongst the younger generation’, its answer was that 
multiculturalism and Britain’s failure to assert the superiority of its national values 
had encouraged young Muslims to feel victimised and adopt anti-western views.86 
Moreover the report argued that: 
 
More generally, we need to revive a sense of direction, shared purpose 
and confidence in British society. Islamism is only one expression of a 
wider cultural problem of self-loathing and confusion in the West. One 
way to tackle this is to bring to an end the institutional attacks on national 
identity – the counterproductive cancellation of Christmas festivities, the 
neurotic bans on displays of national symbols, and the sometimes crude 
anti-Western bias of history lessons – which can create feelings of 
defensiveness and resentment.87  
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The report was released to the press on the day of a speech by David Cameron attacking 
multiculturalism and Muslim ‘extremists’ who seek ‘special treatment’.88 
Simultaneously, the conservative party also published a policy document suggesting 
that such ‘separatism’ was encouraged by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).89 
Later in the same year, PX published a report on ‘extremist literature’ which claimed 
that ‘radical material’ was being distributed in a quarter of Britain’s mosques and 
called for greater regulation and intervention in order to promote a ‘moderate Islam’.90 
The credibility of the report was called into question by a BBC Newsnight investigation 
which suggested that book receipts collected by PX researchers were faked.91 In the 
same year the then chairman of PX Charles Moore, a former editor of 
The Telegraph and The Spectator, gave a speech outlining a ‘possible conservative 
approach to the question of Islam in Britain’. In the speech he argued that the 
government should maintain a list of non-violent extremists—Muslim organisations 
which, while not actually inciting violence, ‘nevertheless advocate such anti-social 
attitudes that they should not receive public money or official recognition’—in this 
category would fall any groups with links to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jamaati-
e-Islami (such as the Muslim Association of Britain and the aforementioned MCB), as 
well as individuals such as Tariq Ramadan.92   
 
PX has also defended the UK government’s PREVENT strategy arguing that the 
Muslim anti-PREVENT lobby which has dominated public discourse is not 
representative of the wider Muslim community in the UK. PX claims that these groups 
have deliberately mischaracterised the strategy as a racist attack on Muslims.93 Indeed 
                                                     
88 Arun Kundnani, ‘How are think-tanks shaping the political agenda on Muslims in the UK?’, 
Institute for Race Relations, 2nd September 2008. Retrieved 10th September 2020: 
https://www.kundnani.org/how-are-thinktanks-shaping-the-political-agenda-on-muslims-in-britain/  
89 Will Woodward, ‘Tories set sights on separatist British Muslims’, The Guardian, 30th January 2007. 
Retrieved 7th September 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/jan/30/uk.race  
90 MacEoin (2007), p. 7. 
91 Kundnani (2008), op. cit. Also see: ‘Policy Exchange Dispute’, BBC Talk About Newsnight, 29th May 
2008. Retrieved 7th September 2020: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2008/05/policy_exchange_dispute_update.html  
92 Kundnani (2008), op. cit.  
93 ‘Islamist attacks on Sara Khan show importance of Extremism Commissioner’, London: Policy 
Exchange, 
 23 
PX carried out a 2016 survey which, they argue, shows that Muslim communities are 
generally relaxed about government intervention to tackle extremism.94 
 
iii) The Henry Jackson Society 
Founded in 2005, the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is named after the interventionist 
US Senator Henry Jackson (1912-1983), a Democrat with strong conservative 
leanings. The HJS was launched online on 11 March 2005 and its current director is 
Alan Mendoza. It is a registered charity in England and Wales and receives financial 
backing from private donations and grant-making organisations which support its 
work. Although they do not refer to themselves as ‘neoconservative’, the society is 
steeped in neoconservative ideology largely articulated by US intellectuals such as 
William and Irving Kristol, Michael Lind and Charles Krauthammer. The HJS’s 
homepage originally displayed the following message: 
 
The Henry Jackson Society is a non-profit organisation that seeks to 
promote the following principles: that liberal democracy should be 
spread across the world; that as the world’s most powerful democracies, 
the United States and the European Union – under British leadership – 
must shape the world more actively by intervention and example; that 
such leadership requires political will, a commitment to universal human 
rights and the maintenance of a strong military with global expeditionary 
reach; and that too few of our leaders in Britain and the rest of Europe 
today are ready to play a role in the world that matches our strength and 
responsibilities.95 
 
What is ‘neo-conservativism’? One of the leading intellectuals within this movement 
in the US, the late Charles Krauthammer, contrasted it with three other approaches to 
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foreign policy: ‘isolationism’, ‘liberal-internationalism’, and ‘realism’.96 The first 
Krauthammer rejects for being ‘an ideology of fear’ because it promotes and reflects 
‘fear of trade’, ‘immigrants’ and ‘the Other’. Furthermore, Krauthammer castigates 
‘isolationists’ because they favour ‘pulling up the drawbridge to Fortress America’. The 
problem with ‘liberal-internationalism’, according to Krauthammer, is that it stresses 
‘multilateralism’, which in turn threatens ‘to blunt the pursuit of American national 
interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests’. Finally, ‘realism’ 
is rejected because it defines ‘interest’ in terms of ‘power’, and we ‘cannot live by power 
alone’, for ‘America’s national interest’ is ‘an expression of values’.97 Indeed, in 
contrast to realists, neoconservatives are radical idealists sometimes defining 
themselves as ‘revolutionaries’. Despite Krauthammer’s nod to immigration neo-
conservativism in both its US and UK versions has been informed by a nativism deeply 
antithetical to immigration, multiculturalism and Islam. This nativism is also often 
combined with a strong dose of American exceptionalism especially the trope of 
‘manifest destiny’—the idea that the US has a duty and mission to spread freedom and 
democracy around the world. Thus, neoconservatives have advocated an aggressive 
interventionist foreign policy as key to destroying international terror networks and 
demonstrating a will to defeat terror through ‘shock and awe’—the demonstrative 
effects of operations like the invasion of Iraq which would be a sanguine assertion of 
Western military power.98 This draws from the ‘clash of civilizations’ framework 
described earlier deriving from the work of Bernard Lewis who argued that Bin-Laden 
and Saddam ultimately shared the same pathologies and that Arabs only understand 
the language of force.99  
 
One of the most prolific voices within the HJS is the current associate director Douglas 
Murray a British author and political commentator. He is also a senior fellow at the 
Gatestone Institute and a columnist for The Spectator. In his first book Neo-
conservativism: Why we need it (2005) Murray argued for the moral clarity of neo-
conservativism as the most potent ideological weapon against the existential threat of 
‘Islamo-fascism’ and argued for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as benevolent 
                                                     
96 Krauthammer quoted in Kerwick (2015), p. 22. Also see Fukuyama (2006), pp. 1-12. 
97 Krauthammer quoted in Kerwick (2015), p. 22. 
98 Ahmed (2014), p. 167. 
99 Waldman op. cit. 
 25 
interventions which (in his view at the time of writing) were bound to succeed 
militarily. The real battleground, however, was one of ideas and here Murray argued 
that the West has been hobbled by the scourge of multiculturalism which has 
generated a crippling ‘dictatorship of relativism’ that gives the enemy a distinct 
advantage: 
The West is now swamped by this notion. In our domestic politics it is 
epitomised by the nightmares of moral equivalence and political 
correctness. It is also of course at the root of the barren and - as 
thinkers as diverse as Fukuyama and Huntington have put it - innately 
anti-Western creed of multiculturalism. It holds that all things are 
equal which would of course be fine if they were: but they are not. The 
good cannot be equated or judged equal to the bad, nor should the 
sublime be levelled alongside, or tarred by, the ridiculous.100 
 
A culture which is imbued with relativism, argues Murray, can in the end find no 
reason to fight for its own salvation. Europe can only save itself, he asserts, if it 
unambiguously stands up for its values and rediscovers absolutism in the defence 
of these values. Armed with this philosophy Murray has consistently attacked 
multiculturalism and what he calls in another book ‘Islamophilia’ a malady which, 
Murray argues, afflicts metropolitan elites in the West who have treated Islam with 
kid gloves with disastrous consequences.101 In a speech to the Dutch parliament in 
2006 Murray asserted that in order to counteract the threat that Islam poses to the 
West: ‘Conditions for Muslims in Europe must be made harder across the board: 
Europe must look like a less attractive proposition’.102 Furthermore, he called for the 
banning of ‘all immigration into Europe from Muslim countries’, and advocated that 
European Muslims who ‘take part in, plot, assist or condone violence against the west 
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must be forcibly deported to their place of origin’. During the speech, Murray called 
for the extension of the ‘global war on terrorism’ to ‘Iran, Syria, and any regime which 
sponsors or supports terrorism’.103 In a 2018 piece in the US neoconservative organ 
The National Review Murray defended the far-right organisation the English Defence 
League (EDL) describing it as ‘a street-protest movement in Britain whose aims could 
probably best be summarised as ‘anti-Islamization’. In the same piece he called for the 
release of EDL’s founder, Tommy Robinson who had been arrested in 2018 for 
breaching the peace outside the court during an ongoing grooming trial.104 
 
In light of concerns that they only appealed to the hard right of the conservative party 
HJS tried to assert their bipartisanship. In order to appeal to a wider audience, the 
epithet ‘neocon’ was dropped and an attempt was made to broaden their appeal 
beyond the right wing of the political spectrum.105 This was done with reference to the 
book Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a Neo-Conservative Foreign 
Policy (2005) by Oliver Kamm (a founding signatory of the HJS). In this book Kamm 
tries to place neo-conservativism in a wider tradition of left-wing anti-totalitarianism 
appealing to the foreign policy outlooks of Clement Atlee and Ernest Bevin: ‘Indeed, 
the neoconservative stance accords with the historic values of the democratic Left, and 
neo-conservativism itself should be seen as a contemporary variant of traditional 
liberal-internationalism (though one with less stress on the role of international 
institutions)’.106 Moreover, he writes: ‘The terrorists of 9/11 were not making a 
statement about poverty and oppression. Rather, they were acting out an ideological 
imperative of striking at the institutions of Western civilisation: constitutional 
government, international commerce and a civilian-controlled military’.107 Thus, for 
Kamm the intervention in Iraq ‘was not strictly a “humanitarian war”: it was an “anti-
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totalitarian war”. It was a war in the cause of liberty.’108 In Kamm’s view of history the 
issues around Saddam, Iran and the Middle East are analogous to those faced during 
the Cold War — that opposition to totalitarianism implies the drive for regime change. 
To secure the collective interests of the West, to deal with the threat of terrorist attack 
and to defeat tyrannical regimes, you can and must impose from outside and above a 
form of ‘democracy’.109 For Kamm, the Iraq experience vindicates this view, and he 
saw the establishment of a fragile electoral democracy in Iraq as a vital achievement. 
Indeed, despite the chaos in Iraq after the invasion, neoconservatives like Kamm, 
Murray and others have continued to defend the legacy of the war by for example 
arguing that the Arab Spring uprisings, starting in 2011, were largely inspired by the 
downfall of Saddam and the establishment of electoral democracy in Iraq. This view 
was most forcefully articulated by Christopher Hitchens whose journey from 
revolutionary socialism to neo-conservativism echoed that of many of the founders of 
the neoconservative movement in the US—described acerbically by Irving Kristol as 
‘liberals mugged by reality’.110 
 
B) Establishment think-tanks 
These think-tanks are closer to the centre of the UK political spectrum than the 
previous ones. These institutions are very much part of the establishment foreign 
policy community. In this category are think-tanks such as Chatham House, Royal 
United Services Institute, The Foreign Policy Centre and the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies. Like the previous category we have considered, they have over 
the years both drawn from and contributed to the central paradigms of ‘orthodox’ 
terrorism studies. In doing so, however, they have often accommodated a more 
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divergent range of opinions than the conservative/orthodoxy discussed above. 
Generally speaking, they have given cautious support to central aspects of the ‘war on 
terror’ such as the invasion of Afghanistan while at the same time expressing criticism 
of specific aspects of it—such as the Iraq war and sometimes PREVENT. 
 
i) The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)  
As we have seen RUSI is the oldest think-tank in the UK. It came into existence in 1831 
at the instigation of the Duke of Wellington, and was originally known as the Naval 
and Military Library and Museum. Its mission according to its website is ‘to inform, 
influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world’.111 RUSI serves 
as a source of quotes for journalists but also frequently provides content for the BBC 
News website. Currently, its patron is the Queen, its President is the Duke of Kent, its 
Senior Vice President is former CIA chief and US General David Petraeus and its 
Chairman is the former British Defence Secretary Lord Hutton. Moreover, its 
council includes an array of current and former politicians and military personnel. 
Despite its description of itself as ‘independent’, therefore, RUSI is ‘very much a 
creature of the British state and military establishment, without which it would neither 
have been created nor would it exist in recognisable form today’.112  
 
RUSI works closely with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at 
Kings College London and especially its director, Peter Neumann, who is a senior 
associate fellow at RUSI. Much of the work on terrorism in recent years at RUSI has 
been produced by Rafaello Pantucci who rejects common explanations for the rise of 
militant Islam among British youth, such as economic exclusion and the influence of 
hard-line clerics. Moreover, whilst acknowledging its necessity, he has been critical of 
the UK government’s PREVENT programme arguing that it may be exacerbating the 
very threat it is seeking to prevent.113 In his work on terrorism, based on interviews, 
conversations, briefings, court documents and published source, Pantucci 
acknowledges the role of ideology but sees it as one of three inter-linked factors in 
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understanding ‘radicalisation’: ideology, grievance, and mobilisation. According to 
Pantucci, Jihadi ideology offers a way for young immigrants (or the children of 
immigrants) to transcend their various ethnic identities. These youth are often 
afflicted by an acute identity crisis—they do not feel British yet do not really feel that 
they belong to any other country. Thus, the lure of the global umma as an alternative 
and potentially liberating identity is highly seductive because fighting for an 
internationalist cause offers an answer to the question, ‘Who am I?’114 This opens the 
door for grievances: the more Western countries become involved militarily in the 
Islamic world, particularly in ways that kill civilians, the more British Muslim youth 
see defending their foreign coreligionists as a legitimate goal. The third factor is the 
existence of a mobilising network of recruiters, today usually functioning online. In 
the UK, these recruiters espouse violent versions of either Salafi or Qutbist ideologies. 
Pantucci argues that behind the terrorist threat are complex social, religious and 
political factors which have been ‘catalysed by the impact of an external ideology that 
created a new form of Jihadist mini-movement in Britain’.115 Thus, whilst ideology is 
a vital ingredient in the ‘radicalisation’ process it is a necessary but not sufficient 
explanation for the turn to terrorist violence. As Pantucci relates: 
 
Three main drivers have to be in place before individuals become 
involved in terrorism: ideology, grievance and mobilisation. How they 
coalesce is dictated by random events that are difficult to forecast much 
as a fruit machine spinning in tandem and occasionally lining up is hard 
to predict. The process is one predicated upon a series of contributory 
factors, but there is no clear way of accurately measuring which one has 
a greater impact than the others. All three drivers need to be in place in 
order for some connection, however tenuous, to prompt an individual to 
turn from a disenfranchised member into an adherent of a violent 
cause.116  
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Pantucci uses this fruit-machine analogy to suggest that while all three factors 
(ideology, grievance and mobilisation) may be present in an individual they have to be 
‘aligned’:  
 
There is clearly a moment or an event that occurs in a person’s mind to 
trigger the decision that terrorism is the path forward. This might take 
the form of a specific event in an individual’s life or an external one (a 
national foreign policy decision) which drives the individual or ‘bunch of 
guys’, to quote Sageman, to conclude that something must be done. In 
some cases, it is hard to distinguish mobilisation from the spark caused 
by alignment: an individual (or group) might have other radicalising 
elements present but it is actual contact with ‘real’ jihadis (those 
individuals connected to Al-Qaida or affiliated groups) that spurs the 
move from talk to action.117  
 
In understanding ‘mobilisation’ Pantucci’s work draws heavily from the body of 
terrorism research which has highlighted the importance of networks. The most 
influential scholar working in this field is Marc Sageman who has argued that 
participants in the global Jihadi movements are not atomised individuals but actors 
linked to each other through complex webs of direct or mediated exchanges. Applying 
Social Network Analysis to understand the nature and dynamics of these networks 
Sageman argues that:  
 
A group of people can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes 
connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are attached 
to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more 
connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist 
network. A few highly connected hubs dominate the architecture of the 
global Salafi jihad.118  
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The more connected a group is with others within the Jihadi movement, the more 
connections it has established and the greater the likelihood it functions as a ‘hub’. The 
more isolated a group remains, the fewer the links. Unlike hierarchical networks that 
can be eliminated through decapitation of the leadership, a small-world network is 
more durable because of its dense interconnectivity. Thus, a significant number of 
nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on the integrity of the network. 
Actions such as stopping individual terrorists arbitrarily at the borders will generally 
not affect the network’s structure leaving it largely undisturbed. Crucially, Sageman 
argues, it is the hubs of a small-world network that are particularly vulnerable to 
targeted attack. If enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, 
non-communicating islands of nodes. Were Jihadi networks to sustain such damage, 
they would be incapable of mounting sophisticated large-scale operations like the 9/11 
attacks and would be reduced to small attacks by ‘lone-wolves’ or what Sageman refers 
to as ‘singletons’.119 This picture of Islamic militancy as composed of nodes of personal 
associations coalescing to form groups that are self-radicalising, self-sustaining and 
self-motivating is at the heart of Pantucci’s understanding of the way in which 
grievances can interact with an individual’s sense of imagined community. The 
perception that others with whom one feels a common bond are being humiliated and 
oppressed can be a powerful driver for action according to this view. It is in the 
existence of a sense of community, whether that be a group of local friends or the 
wider umma that he believes the roots of violence can be found.  
 
These ideas about networks and group dynamics were not taken very seriously by 
counter-terrorism officials immediately after 9/11 who were focusing on isolated 
sleeper-cells implanted from overseas by al-Qaeda and waiting for the command from 
Bin-Laden to attack.120 The idea that British-born Muslims themselves could be a 
threat was barely imagined. But Operation Crevice in 2004 when a network of British 
Muslims of Pakistani origin who were planning to blow up the Ministry of Sound 
nightclub in London were arrested changed this attitude. Consequently, the 
intelligence services became more attuned to the importance of networks in 
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understanding ‘radicalisation’. This network had been to Pakistan for training but only 
after they had radicalised. Moreover, there was no evidence that their radicalisation 
was the result of brainwashing or recruitment by a militant preacher—they had 
apparently self-radicalised within their own network.121 
 
ii) Chatham House 
Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was 
founded in 1920 and is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation based in London. 
Its mission, according to its website, is to ‘analyse and promote the understanding of 
major international issues and current affairs’. It is the originator of the famous 
Chatham House Rule.122 Practically all Chatham House publications carry a disclaimer 
to the effect that it is precluded by its Charter from advocating an institutional policy. 
However, it seems clear from the Institute’s desire to attract government officials as 
speakers as well as into its membership and round-table discussions that Chatham 
House has maintained a close relationship with the policymaking process.123 
 
One of the most prolific scholars working at Chatham House is Toby Dodge, a 
professor in the Department of International Relations at LSE and director of its 
Kuwait Programme. An Iraq specialist with years of field-work in Iraq to his credit, 
Dodge has been one of the most outspoken critics of the Iraq war from within the UK 
think-tank community. In 2002 Dodge was one of ‘six wise men’ (him and five other 
academics working on the Middle East) who met with Tony Blair and warned him of 
the consequences of the decision to invade Iraq. The other five academics were George 
Joffe, Lawrence Freeman, Michael Clarke (then director of RUSI), Charles Tripp and 
Steven Simon. In an interview in The Independent Dodge recalls the meeting: ‘They 
were expecting a short, sharp, easy campaign and that the Iraqis would be grateful’. 
He warned of a possible disaster: that Iraqis would fight for their country against the 
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invaders rather than just celebrate the fall of their leader. He warned that a long and 
nasty civil war could follow. ‘My aim that day was to tell them as much as I could, so 
that there would be no excuses and nobody saying, “I didn’t know”’.124 In an article 
echoing these warnings published on the Chatham House website in 2002 Dodge 
argued that: ‘Successful military action against Iraq will require large numbers of US 
troops. The removal of Saddam Hussein, if possible, could cause greater regional 
instability than his continued rule’.125 In 2010 Dodge argued, contra realist theories of 
International Relations which emphasise power-maximalisation and interests as the 
driving forces of foreign policy, that the Iraq invasion was highly ideological—an 
attempt to apply what he called ‘kinetic neoliberalism’ to Iraq. According to Dodge: 
‘Decision-makers are both empowered and constrained by the ideational categories 
they have inherited from within their own societies and through which they make 
sense of the world’.126 Dodge argues that the ‘ideational categories’ which ‘empowered 
and constrained’ the architects of the Iraq war were a synthesis of neo-conservativism 
and neoliberalism—what he refers to as ‘kinetic neoliberalism’: 
 
The dominance of these major analytical categories—American 
exceptionalism, the imminence of major international threats and 
unilateralism from neo-conservatism; the universality of individual 
liberty, the power of free markets and the threat of state power from neo-
liberalism—dominated George W. Bush’s policy responses to the attacks 
of September 2001. Interestingly, after the State of the Union Address in 
January 2002, in a series of major policy speeches through the build-up 
to the invasion, culminating in the National Security Strategy in 
September, neo-liberal tropes came to dominate policy towards Iraq. At 
this stage neo-conservatism had little to say about how the domestic 
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structures of an errant state should be reformed; at a policy level, this left 
prescriptions to be shaped by neo-liberalism.127 
 
In 2013 Dodge wrote another piece, published on the Chatham House website, 
arguing that regime change, far from bringing the neoliberal vision of democracy, free 
markets and the rule of law to Iraq, had instead created a highly corrupt, kleptocratic 
and sectarian state—the perfect conditions for the rise of ISIS.128 In another article, 
co-written by Becca Wasser, Dodge highlighted the decision to dismantle the Iraqi 
army by the US-led occupying force, combined with eight years of institutionalised 
corruption and sectarianism—particularly in the newly constructed army—under 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, as particularly important in understanding the 
collapse of the Iraqi state and the rise of ISIS in 2014.129  
 
C) Alternative-radical think-tanks 
 
These are think-tanks which challenge aspects of or completely reject the dominant 
assumptions of orthodox terrorism studies. They are more closely aligned with the left 
wing of British politics but also sometimes with Islamist groups in the UK. They 
include Demos, Claystone, The Islamic Human Rights Commission, CAGE and 
Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND). These think-tanks draw on some of 
the themes in the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) literature discussed above. They 
might question the existence of a coherent organisation called ‘al-Qaeda’ or suggest an 
alternative understanding of the causes of ‘terrorism’ such as injustice, poverty or 
racism. They might also seek to portray ‘terrorists’ as rational actors motivated by 
political grievances and warn against aggressive military action or the curtailment of 
civil liberties.130 They generally defend multiculturalism and emphasise racism and 
Islamophobia as well as UK foreign policy as the main drivers of ‘radicalisation’ whilst 
downplaying the importance of Islamist ideology. They are also highly critical of the 
UK government’s PREVENT programme and sometimes call for its complete 
dismantling.  
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i) Demos 
 
Demos is a left-wing think tank based in the UK with a cross-party political viewpoint. 
It was founded in 1993 by former Marxism Today editor Martin Jacques and Geoff 
Mulgan who became its first director. It specialises in social policy, developing 
evidence-based solutions in a range of areas—from education and skills to health and 
housing. Demos is the only major think-tank that has attempted an alternative 
approach to notions of Muslim extremism. Its research has sought to challenge the 
conflation of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.131 In July 2008, as part 
of this research project, Demos decided to host a session at the Islam Expo in London 
Olympia on the subject of ‘The Islamist Threat: myth or reality?’.132  In 2008 Demos 
published a report entitled ‘Social Resilience and National Security—A British 
perspective’ by Rachel Briggs which discussed the causes of radicalisation. It identified 
socio-economic deprivation as one of the drivers of terrorism, but most importantly 
identified grievance over Western foreign policy and the way criticism of such policies 
has been restricted by the government as a major source of discontent:  
 
The other key local factor for British Muslims is foreign policy, with many 
highly opposed to the war in Iraq and policy towards Israel/Palestine. But 
their fiercest anger is caused not so much by the detail of policy, but from 
the government’s refusal to allow open discussion about it. In the 
aftermath of the London bombings in 2005, the Home Office convened a 
series of workshops with Muslim community leaders aimed at working 
together to tackle violent extremism. There was enormous goodwill 
towards the government immediately after the attacks, but this was 
squandered when Ministers refused to include foreign policy on the 
agenda. This silly own goal reinforced the community’s sense of 
voicelessness, ironically at the very moment it had finally gained a seat at 
the table.133 
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The report also criticises the securitisation of Muslims in the UK arguing that it plays 
‘straight into Al Qaida’s narrative of grievance and injustice as many Muslims began 
to suffer under the new security regime’.134 Instead, it calls for a ‘community-based’ 
approach to counter-terrorism: 
 
Community-based counter-terrorism is part of a much broader trend for 
nonstate actors to play a greater role in national security. Governments 
no longer have a monopoly on security. Since the treaty of Westphalia, 
when the concept of the modern nation state was born, the prizes worth 
fighting for have always been firmly within the gift of nation-states: 
secrets, land, resources, people, and so on. But at the start of the 21st 
century, companies, non-governmental organisations and ordinary 
citizens have important contributions to make, too. Security is no longer 
something that governments can do to you or for you on your behalf; it 
needs to be co-created by a much wider range of actors working in a 
networked and interdependent way.135  
 
The report argues that this approach is vital for four reasons. Firstly, communities are 
essential sources of information and intelligence— ‘our own built-in early warning 
system’.136 Secondly, communities picking up these signals are themselves best placed 
to act pre-emptively to divert their young people from violent extremism: the self-
policing society. Third, while the state must also play a role, communities must take 
the lead in tackling problems that either create grievances or hinder their ability to 
organise, such as poverty, poor educational and employment attainment, and the 
paucity of effective leadership and representation.137 Finally, the police and security 
service cannot act without the consent of communities they are there to protect.138 The 
report claims that this ‘community-based’ approach had been adopted by the UK 
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government and ‘now forms a central plank of the UK government’s own response’.139 
Examples of this community-based approach are not discussed in the report, however, 
nor is the PREVENT programme mentioned. It could be surmised, however, that one 
example of this community-based approach was the process leading to the arrest of 
the Jihadist preacher Abu Hamza in 2004. Hamza, an Egyptian cleric who had lost an 
eye and a hand fighting in Afghanistan, became Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in 
London in 1998. When his extremist beliefs became clear the board of trustees at the 
mosque asked him to leave but he refused and turned the mosque into ‘the public face 
of the extremist Jihadi movement in Britain’.140 Eventually, after evidence was found 
of Hamza’s involvement with terrorism, he was arrested and eventually jailed in 2006, 
a process which was undertaken with cooperation from the local Muslim community 
and notably the Muslim Association of Britain who took over trusteeship of the 
mosque.141 It is precisely this kind of dialogue and co-operation—especially with 
Islamist-leaning organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain that Quilliam 
has criticised claiming that: ‘The ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same 
as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics’.142 
 
The Demos report ends by discussing the problem of framing violent extremism as 
‘radicalisation’ arguing that ‘radicalism’ can be a positive force and a source of social 
resilience which can help young Muslims resist the lure of Jihadi terrorist preachers: 
 
It is true that Islamism is growing in popularity amongst young Muslims, 
largely because Islamist groups are the only ones willing to discuss the 
political concerns of young people. But we must be careful to remember 
that Islamism is not inherently violent and if these groups offer an outlet 
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for frustrations they are perhaps part of the solution, rather than the 
problem.143   
 
This theme was reiterated in another report published by Demos in 2010 entitled: 
‘The edge of violence: a radical approach to extremism’ which states: 
 
The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a 
process of radicalisation. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. 
Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-
violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies.144  
 
Note the distinction here with the approach of groups like Quilliam, PX and HJS who 
have identified ‘non-violent radicalism’ as potentially dangerous and thus 
legitimately the object of state scrutiny and securitisation.145 
 
ii) Claystone  
 
Claystone is a small London-based think-tank specialising in Muslim issues. Its staff 
regularly give interviews on the British Muslim TV channel 5 Pillars. Claystone 
representatives have also given interviews to the BBC.146 It was very active in the mid-
2000s producing a number of reports which were highly critical of the PREVENT 
programme. One of its most prolific researchers, Arun Kundnani, is an adjunct 
professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches 
terrorism studies at John Jay College. He has been a visiting fellow at Leiden 
University, The Netherlands, an Open Society fellow, and the editor of the journal 
Race and Class. Kundnani is the author of a well-received book on the war on terror 
entitled The Muslims are Coming (2014) which draws from many of the themes of 
Critical Terrorism Studies, discussed earlier, but also, as we shall see, from some of 
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the ‘orthodox’ scholars in terrorism studies. In his book Kundnani rejects the idea that 
ideology is the main driver of extremism: 
 
Theories of radicalization that purport to describe why young Muslims 
become terrorists are central to counterterrorism policies on both sides 
of the Atlantic. But these make an unfounded assumption that ‘Islamist’ 
ideology is the root cause of terrorism. To do so enables a displacement 
of the war on terror’s antagonisms on to the plane of Muslim culture. 
Muslims become what Samuel Huntington described as the ‘ideal 
enemy’, a group that is racially and culturally distinct and ideologically 
hostile. The political scientist Mahmood Mamdani had earlier identified 
such ‘culture talk’ as the default explanation of violence when proper 
political analysis is neglected.147 
 
In a report he wrote for Claystone in 2015 entitled ‘A decade lost: rethinking 
radicalisation and extremism’ Kundnani amplifies many of the themes in his book 
arguing that the term ‘radicalisation’ and its associated conceptual framework are 
products of the post-9/11 period. Indeed, before then, scholars of terrorism did not use 
the concept in their attempts to understand the causes of terrorism. Referencing the 
work of one of the key members of the ‘terrorism mafia’ mentioned earlier (Martha 
Crenshaw), Kundnani argues for a three-level account of the causes of terrorism, 
involving: i) individual motivation and belief systems, ii) decision-making and strategy 
within a terrorist movement, and iii) The wider political and social context with which 
terrorist movements interact.148 Kundnani argues that today’s radicalisation models in 
effect neglect the second and third of these levels and focus all their attention on the 
individual level. Quoting the historian Mark Sedgwick, he calls for a critical 
reconstruction of conventional radicalisation models:  
 
The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some 
extent, the ideology and the group, and significantly deemphasizes the 
wider circumstances—the ‘root causes’ that it became so difficult to talk 
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about after 9/11, and that are still often not brought into analyses. So long 
as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances 
are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will 
often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause’.149  
 
Kundnani criticises dominant narratives drawn from mainstream terrorism scholars 
and what we have referred to in this paper as ‘conservative-orthodox’ think-tanks 
which largely ignore the political context and the internal decision-making within an 
insurgent social movement as largely irrelevant in explaining why terrorist violence 
occurs. These theories imply that, once an individual has adopted an extremist 
religious ideology, terrorism will result, irrespective of the political context or any 
calculation on the part of an organisation or social movement. Castigating the 
advocates of the ‘new terrorism’ paradigm, discussed earlier, he argues that the 
intellectual tools used to analyse political violence in the past are no longer used by 
terrorism experts with devastating consequences for counter-terrorism and for the 
lives of many law-abiding Muslim citizens. 
 
Based on this analysis Kundnani calls for an end to PREVENT policy since this 
programme has made British citizens less safe by alienating Muslims and making the 
Jihadi narrative more appealing.150 He also advises that information about risks of 
radicalisation should be shared with authorities only once it crosses the line to 
incitement to violence, financing of terrorism or an intention to commit acts of 
violence.151 According to Kundnani: ‘The significant government resources that have 
been made available to bring about a broader ideological transformation among 
British Muslims are more productively redirected to this purpose’.152 Moreover, 
governments should ‘publicly defend freedom of religion, even for individuals who 
choose to adopt religious beliefs deemed extremist’.153 Indeed, Kundnani argues that 
deradicalisation programmes violate the principle of secularism because the state is 
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effectively endorsing an official version of Islam deemed compatible with liberalism.154 
The UK government should publicly acknowledge that foreign policy decisions are a 
significant factor in creating political contexts within which terrorism becomes more 
or less likely. Finally, Kundnani calls for the creation of ‘safe-spaces’ for wide-ranging 
discussions of religious ideology, identity and foreign policy, particularly among young 
people who feel excluded from mainstream politics.155 Those spaces should not be 
undercut by the fear that expressions of radical views will attract the attention of 
intelligence agencies and police counter-terrorism units.156  
 
4) Conclusion  
 
How has the UK think-tank community influenced counter-terrorism policy? After 
9/11 neoconservative think-tanks like the Henry Jackson Society dominated the 
discourse on the causes of terrorism and the appropriate response to them on both 
sides of the Atlantic. For the neoconservatives, who dominated US policy-making on 
counter-terrorism in the early years of the ‘war on terror’ terrorism was seen as a 
product of ‘Islamic culture’.157 As we have seen, scholars like Bernard Lewis, a key 
advisor on the Middle East to the George W. Bush administration, argued that Islam 
had a cultural propensity towards totalitarian rejections of modernity. This anti-
modernism ran so deep in the culture of the Middle East that only war could overturn 
it and inaugurate a cultural and political transformation of the region. Tony Blair 
apparently accepted much of this neoconservative analysis and his support for the 
2003 war on Iraq rested—partly at least—on this basis.158 By 2005, when the 
disastrous consequences of the Iraq war had become apparent, counter-terrorism 
policy-makers were looking for new theories that could help them understand how to 
prevent bombings carried out by European citizens, such as those that took place in 
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.159 At this point, the concept of ‘radicalisation’ 
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became central to the emerging models of the causes of terrorism in national security 
circles. 
 
Broadly speaking this debate has been divided into two camps: ‘idealists’ and 
‘materialists’. The former—represented by think-tanks like Quilliam, PX and HJS have 
emphasised ideology in the form of radical Islam as the key to understanding 
radicalisation. In addition, as we have seen, they sometimes emphasised the divisive 
effects of multiculturalism and the lack of adherence to ‘British values’ as encouraging 
terrorism. The latter camp, represented more by think-tanks like RUSI, Demos and 
Claystone, have emphasised ‘material’ factors, like political grievance (mainly foreign 
policy and racism), social-networks and group dynamics more than ideological-
religious factors. Addressing some of these grievances as well as understanding the 
dynamics of these networks was seen as key to countering terrorism. As we have seen, 
these are not mutually exclusive camps and some voices such as Pantucci and 
Crenshaw have argued for a holistic multi-casual explanation for the turn to violent 
extremism which incorporates both ideological and material factors. Indeed, it is 
impossible to disentangle ‘material’ factors such as war or racism from ‘ideological’ 
factors such as discourse, religion and narrative. The former are, partly at least, 
constituted by the latter: whilst material ‘events’ and ‘experiences’ clearly have 
autonomy from their ideological and discursive articulations, they are at the same time 
interpreted and given meaning through such frameworks. Jihadist ideology, for 
example, promotes a powerful ‘narrative of blame’—that the ‘West’, led by the US, is 
engaged in a vast joined-up conspiracy to destroy ‘Islam’.160 This narrative—itself a 
synthesis of a brutally literalist and ahistorical reading of the foundational Islamic 
texts synthesised with ‘Occidentalist’ political propaganda—is twisted and largely 
divorced from reality.161 Nevertheless, as Stephen Holmes argues, any sensible 
response to 9/11 should have aimed at unravelling and weakening the credibility of 
such a narrative. Instead, by invading Iraq, the US and its allies ‘corroborated a central 
proposition in the Jihadist narrative of blame, namely, that Americans feel contempt 
                                                     
160 Holmes (2007), p. 67. 
161 On ‘Occidentalism’ see Buruma and Margalit (2005). Examples of this synthesis can be found in the 
writings of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri such as Knights under the Prophet’s Banner— see 
Kepel and Milelli (2008). 
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for Muslims and ascribe little or no value to Muslim lives’.162 The Trump Presidency 
and its racist language and policies towards Muslims has also strengthened this kind 
of narrative as have, arguably, programmes like PREVENT.  
 
In terms of influencing government policy, the ‘idealists’ have largely won out in this 
debate and the public face of UK counter-terrorism policy continues to be the 
controversial PREVENT programme. Indeed, successive governments have 
consistently denied the causal links between UK foreign policy and radicalisation. 
There are some indications, however, that the intelligence services in the UK have 
acknowledged the role of political grievances in exacerbating the threat of 
international terrorism. For example, Stella Rimington, former head of MI5, in an 
interview with The Guardian in 2008 was asked about the effect of Britain’s invasion 
of Iraq on the terrorist threat to Britain: 
  
Look at what those people who've been arrested or have left suicide 
videos say about their motivation. And most of them, as far as I'm 
aware, say that the war in Iraq played a significant part in persuading 
them that this is the right course of action to take. So, I think you can't 
write the war in Iraq out of history. If what we're looking at is groups 
of disaffected young men born in this country who turn to terrorism, 
then I think to ignore the effect of the war in Iraq is misleading.163 
 
According to Rimington these views were widely held among the intelligence services 
and there is evidence that this was the official view of MI5. For example, the Director 
General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, underlined this 
position in a speech in 2006. Whilst emphasising that the terrorist threat existed 
before 9/11 Manningham-Buller acknowledged the role of political grievances in 
exacerbating the threat:  
                                                     
162 Ibid., p. 68. No doubt the US has intervened disastrously in the Middle East but this has not been a 
war on Muslims or on ‘Islam’. Indeed, in previous conflicts in the not-too-distant past the US has 
intervened on the ‘Muslim’ side: the Afghan-Soviet war during the 1980s for example and in Bosnia 
and Kosovo during the 1990s Balkan Wars. 
163 Decca Aitkenhead, ‘Free Agent’, The Guardian, 18th October 2008. Retrieved: 13th September 2020: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/oct/18/iraq-britainand911  
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The extremists are motivated by a sense of grievance and injustice driven 
by their interpretation of the history between the West and the Muslim 
world … This is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from 
across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex 
issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir 
to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination 
to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide. Afghanistan, the Balkans, 
Chechnya, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir and Lebanon are regularly 
cited by those who advocate terrorist violence as illustrating what they 
allege is Western hostility to Islam.164 
 
Indeed, we have seen, think-tanks such as RUSI which are close to the military-
security establishment in the UK also identify ‘grievance’ as one of the factors driving 
terrorism along with ideology and the dynamics of networks and group-dynamics in 
facilitating ‘self-radicalisation’. It is hoped that the forthcoming papers in this series 
will throw more light on these debates from perspectives outside of the UK as well as 
on the efficacy of alternative ‘deradicalisation’ models which have been less divisive 
than the UK’s PREVENT programme. 
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